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Asymmetric Social Norms

SAFE Working Paper No. 162

15 Pages Posted: 12 Jan 2017

See all articles by Gabriele Camera

Gabriele Camera

Chapman University - Economic Science Institute; University of Bologna - Dept. of Economics

Alessandro Gioffré

University of Florence - Department of Economics and Management; Goethe University Frankfurt - Research Center SAFE

Date Written: January 10, 2017

Abstract

Studies of cooperation in infinitely repeated matching games focus on homogeneous economies, where full cooperation is efficient and any defection is collectively sanctioned. Here we study heterogeneous economies where occasional defections are part of efficient play, and show how to support those outcomes through contagious punishments.

Keywords: cooperation, repeated games, social dilemmas

JEL Classification: C6, C7

Suggested Citation

Camera, Gabriele and Gioffré, Alessandro, Asymmetric Social Norms (January 10, 2017). SAFE Working Paper No. 162. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2897466 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2897466

Gabriele Camera

Chapman University - Economic Science Institute ( email )

Orange, CA 92866
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www1.chapman.edu/~camera/

University of Bologna - Dept. of Economics ( email )

Strada Maggiore 45
Bologna, 40125
Italy

Alessandro Gioffré (Contact Author)

University of Florence - Department of Economics and Management ( email )

Via delle Pandette, 9
Firenze, Florence 50127
Italy

Goethe University Frankfurt - Research Center SAFE ( email )

(http://www.safe-frankfurt.de)
Theodor-W.-Adorno-Platz 3
Frankfurt am Main, 60323
Germany

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