Download This PaperAsymmetric Social Norms
15 Pages Posted: 12 Jan 2017
Date Written: January 10, 2017
Abstract
Studies of cooperation in infinitely repeated matching games focus on homogeneous economies, where full cooperation is efficient and any defection is collectively sanctioned. Here we study heterogeneous economies where occasional defections are part of efficient play, and show how to support those outcomes through contagious punishments.
Keywords: cooperation, repeated games, social dilemmas
JEL Classification: C6, C7
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Camera, Gabriele and Gioffré, Alessandro, Asymmetric Social Norms (January 10, 2017). SAFE Working Paper No. 162, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2897466 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2897466
Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE ( email )
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