Strategic Voting in Open Primaries

41 Pages Posted: 7 Nov 2001

See all articles by Kong-Pin Chen

Kong-Pin Chen

Academia Sinica - Research Center for Humanities and Social Sciences; National Taiwan University - Department of Economics

Sheng-Zhang Yang

National Taiwan University - Department of Economics

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Abstract

The purpose of an open primary is to incorporate more moderate votes into the primary elections. This intention may backfire when nonparty members strategically participate in the primary: The result on an open primary might become even more extreme than when nonparty members are not allowed to vote. Realizing this, the party members might also vote strategically to counter-react. If this occurs, then it might actually coordinate the votes of the party's supporters. The effect of strategic voting behavior on the result of primary depends on the size of the party, turnout rate of the nonparty members, the positions of the candidates and the proportion of voters who vote strategically. Strategic voting behavior can sometimes improve social welfare.

Keywords: open primary, closed primary, strategic voting, Hotelling model, presidential election

JEL Classification: D7, D6, H0

Suggested Citation

Chen, Kong-Pin and Yang, Sheng-Zhang, Strategic Voting in Open Primaries. Public Choice, Vol. 112, pp. 1-30, 2002. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=289800

Kong-Pin Chen (Contact Author)

Academia Sinica - Research Center for Humanities and Social Sciences ( email )

RCHSS
Academia Sinica
Nankang, Taipei, 11529
Taiwan
886 2 2789 8160 (Phone)
886 2 2785 4160 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://idv.sinica.edu.tw/kongpin/

National Taiwan University - Department of Economics

21 Hsiu Chow Rd
Taipei, 10020
Taiwan

Sheng-Zhang Yang

National Taiwan University - Department of Economics

21 Hsiu Chow Rd
Taipei, 10020
Taiwan

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