Abstract

https://ssrn.com/abstract=2899958
 


 



Symmetric Information Bubbles: Experimental Evidence


Yasushi Asako


Waseda University

Yukihiko Funaki


Waseda University - School of Political Science and Economics

Kozo Ueda


Waseda University; Australian National University (ANU) - Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis (CAMA)

Nobuyuki Uto


Waseda University

December 26, 2016

CAMA Working Paper No. 5/2017

Abstract:     
This study experimentally analyses traders’ choices, with and without asymmetric information, based on the riding-bubble model. While asymmetric information has been necessary to explain a bubble in past theoretical models, our experiments show that traders have an incentive to hold a bubble asset for longer, thereby expanding the bubble in a market with symmetric, rather than asymmetric information. This finding implies a possibility that information symmetry promotes cooperation. However, when traders are more experienced, the size of the bubble decreases, in which case bubbles do not arise, even with symmetric information.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 47

Keywords: riding bubbles, crashes, asymmetric information, experiment, clock game

JEL Classification: C72, D82, D84, E58, G12, G18


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Date posted: January 17, 2017  

Suggested Citation

Asako, Yasushi and Funaki, Yukihiko and Ueda, Kozo and Uto, Nobuyuki, Symmetric Information Bubbles: Experimental Evidence (December 26, 2016). CAMA Working Paper No. 5/2017 . Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2899958

Contact Information

Yasushi Asako
Waseda University ( email )
Okhubo Campus, Shinjuku-ku, Room 59-416B
Okhubo Campus, Shinjuku-ku, Room 59-416B
tokyo, Tokyo 169-8555
Togo
Yukihiko Funaki
Waseda University - School of Political Science and Economics ( email )
1-6-1 Nishi-Waseda
Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo 169-8050, Tokyo 169-8050
Japan
Kozo Ueda (Contact Author)
Waseda University ( email )
Okhubo Campus, Shinjuku-ku, Room 59-416B
Okhubo Campus, Shinjuku-ku, Room 59-416B
tokyo, Tokyo 169-8555
Togo
Australian National University (ANU) - Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis (CAMA) ( email )
ANU College of Business and Economics
Canberra, Australian Capital Territory 0200
Australia
Nobuyuki Uto
Waseda University ( email )
Okhubo Campus, Shinjuku-ku, Room 59-416B
Okhubo Campus, Shinjuku-ku, Room 59-416B
tokyo, Tokyo 169-8555
Togo
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