49 Pages Posted: 19 Jan 2017 Last revised: 10 Feb 2017
Date Written: February 2017
Recent literature suggests that creditor intervention following covenant violations mitigates managerial agency problems and plays an important governance role (e.g., Nini, Smith, and Sufi, 2012). This study examines how heightened creditor governance after covenant violations affects corporate tax avoidance decisions. Using a regression discontinuity design, we find that creditor intervention increases borrowers’ tax avoidance in the less aggressive forms. This effect is concentrated among firms under weaker shareholder governance before creditor intervention and among those having lesser bargaining power during subsequent debt renegotiation. Our results indicate that creditors play an active role in shaping corporate tax policy outside of bankruptcy.
Keywords: Covenant Violation, Tax Avoidance
JEL Classification: G21, G30
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Wan, Chi and Zhao, Yijia, Do Creditors Actively Influence Corporate Tax Planning? Evidence from Loan Covenants (February 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2900471 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2900471