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Do Creditors Actively Influence Corporate Tax Planning? Evidence from Loan Covenants

48 Pages Posted: 19 Jan 2017 Last revised: 16 Sep 2017

Chi Wan

University of Massachusetts Boston - Department of Accounting and Finance

Yijia (Eddie) Zhao

University of Massachusetts Boston

Date Written: May 28, 2017

Abstract

Recent literature suggests that creditor intervention following covenant violations mitigates managerial agency problems and plays an important governance role. This study examines how heightened creditor governance after covenant violations affects corporate tax avoidance decisions. Using a regression discontinuity design, we find that creditor intervention increases borrowers’ tax avoidance in the less aggressive forms. This effect is concentrated among firms under weaker shareholder governance before creditor intervention and among those having lesser bargaining power during subsequent debt renegotiation. Our results indicate that creditors play an active role in shaping corporate tax policy outside of bankruptcy.

Keywords: Covenant Violation, Tax Avoidance, Creditor Governance, Agency Problems

JEL Classification: G21, G30

Suggested Citation

Wan, Chi and Zhao, Yijia (Eddie), Do Creditors Actively Influence Corporate Tax Planning? Evidence from Loan Covenants (May 28, 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2900471 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2900471

Chi Wan (Contact Author)

University of Massachusetts Boston - Department of Accounting and Finance ( email )

Boston, MA 02125
United States

Yijia Zhao

University of Massachusetts Boston ( email )

100 Morrissey Blvd.
Boston, MA 02125
United States

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