Mechanism Design When Player's Preferences and Information Coincide

13 Pages Posted: 23 Feb 2017

See all articles by Marcelo Caffera

Marcelo Caffera

University of Montevideo

Juan Dubra

University of Montevideo - Department of Economics

Nicolas Figueroa

Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile

Date Written: December 2, 2016

Abstract

It is well known that when players have private information, vis a vis the designer, and their preferences coincide it is hard to implement the socially desirable outcome. We show that with arbitrarily small fines and arbitrarily noisy inspections, the social choice correspondence can be fully implemented (truth telling is the unique Nash equilibrium).

Keywords: Nash Equilibrium, Mechanism Design, Truth Telling

JEL Classification: D70, Q50

Suggested Citation

Caffera, Marcelo and Dubra, Juan and Figueroa, Nicolas, Mechanism Design When Player's Preferences and Information Coincide (December 2, 2016). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2901008 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2901008

Marcelo Caffera (Contact Author)

University of Montevideo ( email )

Prudencio de Pena 2440
Montevideo, CP 11600
Uruguay
+59827074461 (Phone)

Juan Dubra

University of Montevideo - Department of Economics ( email )

Prudencio de Pena 2440
Montevideo, CP 11600
Uruguay
5982 707 4461 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http:\\www2.um.edu.uy\dubraj

Nicolas Figueroa

Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile ( email )

Av Libertador Bernardo O Higgins 340
Santiago Metropolitan Region
Chile

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