Mechanism Design When Player's Preferences and Information Coincide
13 Pages Posted: 23 Feb 2017
Date Written: December 2, 2016
Abstract
It is well known that when players have private information, vis a vis the designer, and their preferences coincide it is hard to implement the socially desirable outcome. We show that with arbitrarily small fines and arbitrarily noisy inspections, the social choice correspondence can be fully implemented (truth telling is the unique Nash equilibrium).
Keywords: Nash Equilibrium, Mechanism Design, Truth Telling
JEL Classification: D70, Q50
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Caffera, Marcelo and Dubra, Juan and Figueroa, Nicolas, Mechanism Design When Player's Preferences and Information Coincide (December 2, 2016). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2901008 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2901008
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