Shareholder Activism and CSR Disclosure

Posted: 23 Jan 2017

See all articles by Yi Yang

Yi Yang

Victoria University of Wellington

Binh Bui

Victoria University of Wellington

Thu Phuong Truong

Victoria University of Wellington

Date Written: January 21, 2017

Abstract

Our study investigates how shareholder proposal, as an evidence of shareholder activism affects CSR disclosure. Based on the non-legal binding nature of shareholder proposals, our study explores the impact of CSR shareholder proposal activism on the extent of CSR disclosure after controlling for corporate governance mechanisms existent within the firm. Based on a sample of 466 firm-years between 2006 and 2014, we find that CSR shareholder proposals do not significantly change the extent of CSR disclosure. Although we find that shareholder proposals increase social disclosure at the end of the first year, this impact does not continue in the second year. We also find that outside directors, as an internal governance mechanism, substitutes with the monitoring effects from shareholder proposals on the extent of CSR disclosure. Our research contributes to prior studies by exploring the monitoring effects of shareholder proposals on CSR disclosure.

Keywords: shareholder activism, shareholder proposal, CSR disclosure, corporate governance

JEL Classification: M40

Suggested Citation

Yang, Yi and Bui, Binh and Truong, Thu Phuong, Shareholder Activism and CSR Disclosure (January 21, 2017). 8th Conference on Financial Markets and Corporate Governance (FMCG) 2017. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2902989 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2902989

Yi Yang (Contact Author)

Victoria University of Wellington ( email )

Wellington
New Zealand

Binh Bui

Victoria University of Wellington ( email )

P.O. Box 600
Wellington, 6140
New Zealand
+64 4 463 5076 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.victoria.ac.nz/sacl/staff/binhbui.aspx

Thu Phuong Truong

Victoria University of Wellington ( email )

P.O. Box 600
Wellington, 6140
New Zealand
64 4 463 5233 (ext 8961) (Phone)
64 4 463 5076 (Fax)

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
977
PlumX Metrics