The Ultimate Ownership of Western European Corporations

Posted: 12 Nov 2001

See all articles by Mara Faccio

Mara Faccio

Purdue University - Krannert School of Management; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); National University of Singapore (NUS) - Asian Bureau of Finance and Economic Research (ABFER)

Larry H.P. Lang

The Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK) - Department of Finance

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Abstract

We analyze the ultimate ownership and control of 5,232 corporations in 13 Western European countries. Firms are typically widely held (36.93 percent) or family controlled (44.29 percent). Widely-held firms are more important in the U.K. and Ireland, family-controlled firms in continental Europe. Financial and large firms are more likely to be widely-held, while non-financial and small firms are more likely to be family-controlled. State control is important for larger firms in certain countries. Dual class shares and pyramids are used to enhance the control of the largest shareholders, but overall there are significant discrepancies between ownership and control in only a few countries.

Keywords: Ownership, Corporate Governance

JEL Classification: G3

Suggested Citation

Faccio, Mara and Lang, Hsien Ping Larry, The Ultimate Ownership of Western European Corporations. Forthcoming in Journal of Financial Economics. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=290489

Mara Faccio (Contact Author)

Purdue University - Krannert School of Management ( email )

1310 Krannert Building
West Lafayette, IN 47907-1310
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
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European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

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HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org

National University of Singapore (NUS) - Asian Bureau of Finance and Economic Research (ABFER) ( email )

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Singapore, 117592
Singapore

Hsien Ping Larry Lang

The Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK) - Department of Finance ( email )

Shatin, N.T.
Hong Kong
+85 2 2609 7761 (Phone)
+85 2 2603 6586 (Fax)

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