Markets and Sovereignty

22 Pages Posted: 25 Jan 2017 Last revised: 8 Feb 2017

See all articles by G. Mitu Gulati

G. Mitu Gulati

Duke University School of Law

Joseph Blocher

Duke University School of Law

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: January 24, 2017

Abstract

The past few decades have witnessed the growth of an exciting debate in the legal academy about the tensions between economic pressures to commodify and philosophical commitments to the market inalienability of certain items. Sex, organs, babies and college athletics are among the many topics that have received attention. The debates have often have proceeded, however, as if they involve markets on one side and the state on the other, with the relevant question being the ways in which the latter can or should try to facilitate, restrict, or rely on the former. In this essay, we approach the relationship between markets and sovereign control from a different perspective, and contemplate more radical versions of their relationship. What would it mean for governing authority itself to be market alienable? And what would it mean if the people — rather than the state — were the ones who set the prices and controlled the transfers? Could a “market for sovereign control” contribute to welfare-enhancing changes in governance?

Keywords: Sovereignty, markets

JEL Classification: K110, K200, K230, K290, K300, K310, K320, K330, K380, K390, K420

Suggested Citation

Gulati, Gaurang Mitu and Blocher, Joseph, Markets and Sovereignty (January 24, 2017). Osgoode Legal Studies Research Paper No. 19/2017; Duke Law School Public Law & Legal Theory Series No. 2017-16. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2905090 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2905090

Gaurang Mitu Gulati (Contact Author)

Duke University School of Law ( email )

210 Science Drive
Box 90362
Durham, NC 27708
United States

Joseph Blocher

Duke University School of Law ( email )

210 Science Drive
Box 90362
Durham, NC 27708
United States

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