Incomplete Information in Repeated Coordination Games
Forthcoming, Essays in Honor of Moriki Hosoe, eds. Woohyung Lee, Tohru Naito, and Yasunori Ouchida, Springer
13 Pages Posted: 26 Jan 2017
Date Written: January 24, 2017
Asymmetric information can help achieve an efficient equilibrium in repeated coordination games. If there is a small probability that one player can play only one of a continuum of moves, that player can pretend to be of the constrained type and other players will coordinate with him. This hurts efficiency in the repeated battle of the sexes, however, by knocking out the pure-strategy equilibria.
Keywords: ranked coordination, repeated games, coordination game, battle of the sexes, incomplete information
JEL Classification: C72, C73, C78
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation