Incomplete Information in Repeated Coordination Games

Forthcoming, Essays in Honor of Moriki Hosoe, eds. Woohyung Lee, Tohru Naito, and Yasunori Ouchida, Springer

Kelley School of Business Research Paper No. 17-11

13 Pages Posted: 26 Jan 2017

See all articles by Eric Bennett Rasmusen

Eric Bennett Rasmusen

Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Business Economics & Public Policy

Date Written: January 24, 2017

Abstract

Asymmetric information can help achieve an efficient equilibrium in repeated coordination games. If there is a small probability that one player can play only one of a continuum of moves, that player can pretend to be of the constrained type and other players will coordinate with him. This hurts efficiency in the repeated battle of the sexes, however, by knocking out the pure-strategy equilibria.

Keywords: ranked coordination, repeated games, coordination game, battle of the sexes, incomplete information

JEL Classification: C72, C73, C78

Suggested Citation

Rasmusen, Eric Bennett, Incomplete Information in Repeated Coordination Games (January 24, 2017). Forthcoming, Essays in Honor of Moriki Hosoe, eds. Woohyung Lee, Tohru Naito, and Yasunori Ouchida, Springer; Kelley School of Business Research Paper No. 17-11. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2905266 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2905266

Eric Bennett Rasmusen (Contact Author)

Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Business Economics & Public Policy ( email )

Enter your address line 1 here
Enter your address line 2 here
Bloomington, IN Enter your state here 47405
United States
812-855-9219 (Phone)
812-855-3354 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://rasmusen.org

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
30
Abstract Views
145
PlumX Metrics