Honesty Via Choice-Matching

American Economic Review: Insights

American Economic Review, Forthcoming

28 Pages Posted: 25 Jan 2017 Last revised: 23 Sep 2018

See all articles by Jaksa Cvitanic

Jaksa Cvitanic

California Institute of Technology - Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences

Drazen Prelec

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management; MIT Department of Economics; MIT Brain and Cognitive Sciences

Blake Riley

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Department of Economics

Benjamin Tereick

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR), Erasmus School of Economics (ESE)

Date Written: August 14, 2018

Abstract

We introduce choice-matching, a class of mechanisms for eliciting honest responses to a multiple choice question (MCQ), as might appear in a market research study, opinion poll or economics experiment. Under choice-matching, respondents are compensated through an auxiliary task, e.g., a personal consumption choice or a forecast. Their compensation depends both on their performance on the auxiliary task, and on the performance of those respondents who matched their response to the MCQ. We give conditions for such mechanisms to be strictly truth-inducing, focusing on a special case in which the auxiliary task is to predict the answers of other respondents.

Keywords: Proper scoring rules, Bayesian Truth Serum, truth-telling equilibria

JEL Classification: C11, D82, D83, M00

Suggested Citation

Cvitanic, Jaksa and Prelec, Drazen and Riley, Blake and Tereick, Benjamin, Honesty Via Choice-Matching (August 14, 2018). American Economic Review: Insights; American Economic Review, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2905447 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2905447

Jaksa Cvitanic (Contact Author)

California Institute of Technology - Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences ( email )

1200 East California Blvd.
Pasadena, CA 91125
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.hss.caltech.edu/~cvitanic/

Drazen Prelec

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management ( email )

E40-161
MIT
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States
617-253-2833 (Phone)

MIT Department of Economics ( email )

Department of Economics
E52-371
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States

MIT Brain and Cognitive Sciences ( email )

43 Vassar Street
Cambridge, MA 02139
United States

Blake Riley

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Department of Economics ( email )

Champaign, IL
United States

Benjamin Tereick

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR), Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) ( email )

P.O. Box 1738
Rotterdam, NL 3062 PA
Netherlands

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