Tax Evasion in a Cournot Oligopoly with Endogenous Entry

31 Pages Posted: 25 Jan 2017

See all articles by Laszlo Goerke

Laszlo Goerke

University of Trier - Institute of Labour Law and Industrial Relations in the European Union; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Date Written: December 14, 2016

Abstract

If an additional competitor reduces output per firm in a homogenous Cournot-oligopoly, market entry will be excessive. Taxes can correct the so-called business stealing externality. We investigate how evading a tax on operating profits affects the excessive entry prediction. Tax evasion raises the number of firms in market equilibrium and can alter their welfare-maximizing number. In consequence, evasion can aggravate or mitigate excessive entry. Which of these outcomes prevails is determined by the direct welfare consequences of tax evasion and the relationship between evasion and the tax base. We also determine conditions which imply that overall welfare declines with tax evasion.

Keywords: endogenous entry, oligopoly, tax evasion, welfare

JEL Classification: D430, H260, L130

Suggested Citation

Goerke, Laszlo, Tax Evasion in a Cournot Oligopoly with Endogenous Entry (December 14, 2016). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 6239, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2905654

Laszlo Goerke (Contact Author)

University of Trier - Institute of Labour Law and Industrial Relations in the European Union ( email )

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