Coordination of Circuit Breakers? Volume Migration and Volatility Spillover in Fragmented Markets

38 Pages Posted: 27 Jan 2017 Last revised: 6 Feb 2018

See all articles by Benjamin Clapham

Benjamin Clapham

Goethe University Frankfurt Faculty of Economics and Business Administration

Peter Gomber

Goethe University Frankfurt Faculty of Economics and Business Administration

Sven Panz

Goethe University Frankfurt - Faculty of Economics and Business Administration

Date Written: January 27, 2017

Abstract

We study circuit breakers in a fragmented, multi-market environment and investigate whether a coordination of circuit breakers is necessary to ensure their effectiveness. In doing so, we analyze 2,337 volatility interruptions on Deutsche Boerse and research whether a volume migration and an accompanying volatility spillover to alternative venues that continue trading can be observed. Different to prevailing theoretical rationale, trading volume on alternative venues significantly decreases during circuit breakers on the main market and we do not find any evidence for volatility spillover. Moreover, we show that the market share of the main market increases sharply during a circuit breaker. Surprisingly, this is amplified with increasing levels of fragmentation. We identify high-frequency trading as a major reason for the vanishing trading activity on the alternative venues and give empirical evidence that a coordination of circuit breakers is not essential for their effectiveness as long as market participants shift to the dominant venue during market stress.

Keywords: Circuit Breaker, Volatility Interruption, Market Fragmentation, High-Frequency Trading, Stock Market, Regulation, Liquidity

JEL Classification: G14, G15, G18, G28

Suggested Citation

Clapham, Benjamin and Gomber, Peter and Panz, Sven, Coordination of Circuit Breakers? Volume Migration and Volatility Spillover in Fragmented Markets (January 27, 2017). SAFE Working Paper No. 196, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2906719 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2906719

Benjamin Clapham (Contact Author)

Goethe University Frankfurt Faculty of Economics and Business Administration ( email )

Theodor-W.-Adorno-Platz 4
Frankfurt am Main, 60323
Germany

Peter Gomber

Goethe University Frankfurt Faculty of Economics and Business Administration ( email )

Grueneburgplatz 1
Frankfurt am Main, 60323
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.efinancelab.de/no_cache/team/?user_wiwipubs_pi2[showUid]=478

Sven Panz

Goethe University Frankfurt - Faculty of Economics and Business Administration ( email )

Theodor-W.-Adorno-Platz 4
Frankfurt am Main, D-60325
Germany

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