Legitimate Expectations in Canada: Soft Law and Tax Administration

Sas Ansari and Lorne Sossin, “Legitimate Expectations in Canada: Soft Law and tax Administration”, Legitimate Expectations in the Common Law World, M Groves and G Weeks, Eds (Portland, OR; Heart Publishing, 2017)

Osgoode Legal Studies Research Paper No. 30/2017

28 Pages Posted: 27 Jan 2017 Last revised: 5 Feb 2017

See all articles by Sas Tullo

Sas Tullo

York University, Osgoode Hall Law School

Lorne Sossin

York University - Osgoode Hall Law School

Date Written: January 27, 2017

Abstract

This chapter examines the relationship between legitimate expectations and soft law. In what circumstances can an agency’s guidelines create law — or at least legally enforceable expectations? At first glance, the answer would appear obvious. The key reason for developing soft law is to provide guidance and transparency as to the process (and sometimes the substance) of administrative action. Soft law by its nature gives rise to expectations. Whether those expectations, in turn, give rise to legal effects is decidedly less clear. In fact, this question has vexed Canadian administrative law. Nowhere are questions of soft law 1 and legitimate expectations more salient than in the context of tax administration.

Suggested Citation

Tullo, Sas and Sossin, Lorne, Legitimate Expectations in Canada: Soft Law and Tax Administration (January 27, 2017). Sas Ansari and Lorne Sossin, “Legitimate Expectations in Canada: Soft Law and tax Administration”, Legitimate Expectations in the Common Law World, M Groves and G Weeks, Eds (Portland, OR; Heart Publishing, 2017); Osgoode Legal Studies Research Paper No. 30/2017. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2906788

Sas Tullo

York University, Osgoode Hall Law School ( email )

North York, Ontario
Canada

HOME PAGE: http://IncomeTaxAct.ca

Lorne Sossin (Contact Author)

York University - Osgoode Hall Law School ( email )

4700 Keele Street
Toronto, Ontario M3J 1P3
Canada

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
294
rank
100,080
Abstract Views
698
PlumX Metrics