The Economics of Replication

25 Pages Posted: 31 Jan 2017

See all articles by Frank Mueller-Langer

Frank Mueller-Langer

European Commission, Joint Research Center; Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition

Benedikt Fecher

German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin)

Dietmar Harhoff

Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition; Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Gert G. Wagner

German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin); Berlin University of Technology; German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP)

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: January 30, 2017

Abstract

Replication studies are considered a hallmark of good scientific practice. Yet they are treated among researchers as an ideal to be professed but not practiced. To provide incentives and favorable boundary conditions for replication practice, the main stakeholders need to be aware of what drives replication. Here we investigate how often replication studies are published in empirical economics and what types of journal articles are replicated. We find that from 1974 to 2014 less than 0.1% of publications in the top-50 economics journals were replications. We do not find empirical support that mandatory data disclosure policies or the availability of data or code have a significant effect on the incidence of replication. The mere provision of data repositories may be ineffective, unless accompanied by appropriate incentives. However, we find that higher-impact articles and articles by authors from leading institutions are more likely to be subject of published replication studies whereas the replication probability is lower for articles published in higher-ranked journals.

Keywords: Replication, economics of science, science policy, economic methodology

JEL Classification: A1, B4, C12, C13

Suggested Citation

Mueller-Langer, Frank and Fecher, Benedikt and Harhoff, Dietmar and Wagner, Gert G., The Economics of Replication (January 30, 2017). Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper No. 17-03. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2908716 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2908716

Frank Mueller-Langer (Contact Author)

European Commission, Joint Research Center

Seville
Spain

Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition ( email )

Munich
Germany

Benedikt Fecher

German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin) ( email )

Mohrenstraße 58
Berlin, 10117
Germany

Dietmar Harhoff

Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition ( email )

Marstallplatz 1
Munich, Bayern 80539
Germany
+49 89 24246 550 (Phone)
+49 89 24246 599 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.ip.mpg.de

Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München ( email )

Munich, 80539
Germany

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Gert G. Wagner

German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin) ( email )

Mohrenstraße 58
Berlin, 10117
Germany
+49 30 8 978 9290 (Phone)
+49 30 8 978 9200 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.diw.de/programme/jsp/MA.jsp?language=en&uid=gwagner

Berlin University of Technology ( email )

Straße des 17
Berlin, 10623
Germany
+30 8 978 9283 (Phone)

German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP) ( email )

DIW Berlin
10108 Berlin, Berlin
Germany
+49 30 8978 9290 (Phone)
+49 30 8978 9109 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.diw/en/soep

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