A Theory of Dynamic Contracting with Financial Constraints

50 Pages Posted: 1 Feb 2017 Last revised: 23 Jan 2021

See all articles by Ilia Krasikov

Ilia Krasikov

Pennsylvania State University

Rohit Lamba

Pennsylvania State University - College of the Liberal Arts

Date Written: December 30, 2020

Abstract

Financial constraints preclude many surplus producing economic transactions, and inhibit the growth of many others. This paper models financial constraints as the interaction of two forces: the agent has persistent private information and is strapped for cash. The wedge between the optimal and efficient allocation, termed distortion, increases over time with each successive "bad shock" and decreases with each "good shock". At any point in the contract, an endogenous number of "good shocks" are required for the principal to provide some liquidity and then eventually for the contract to become efficient. Efficiency is reached almost surely. The average rate at which contract become efficient is decreasing in persistence of shocks; in particular, the iid model predicts a quick dissolution of financial constraints. This speaks to the relevance of modeling persistence in dynamic models of agency. The problem is solved recursively, and building on the literature, a technical tool of finding the minimal subset of the recursive domain that houses the optimal contract is further developed.

Keywords: Dynamic Mechanism Design, Financial Contracting

JEL Classification: D82, D86, G00

Suggested Citation

Krasikov, Ilia and Lamba, Rohit, A Theory of Dynamic Contracting with Financial Constraints (December 30, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2909334 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2909334

Ilia Krasikov

Pennsylvania State University ( email )

University Park
State College, PA 16802
United States

Rohit Lamba (Contact Author)

Pennsylvania State University - College of the Liberal Arts ( email )

University Park, PA 16802-3306
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.rohitlamba.com

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