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Market Power and Welfare in Asymmetric Divisible Good Auctions

47 Pages Posted: 1 Feb 2017  

Carolina Manzano

Universitat Rovira Virgili

Xavier Vives

University of Navarra - IESE Business School; Universitat Pompeu Fabra (UPF); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

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Date Written: December 2016

Abstract

We analyze a divisible good uniform-price auction that features two groups each with a finite number of identical bidders. Equilibrium is unique, and the relative market power of a group increases with the precision of its private information but declines with its transaction costs. In line with empirical evidence, we find that an increase in transaction costs and/or a decrease in the precision of a bidding group's information induces a strategic response from the other group, which thereafter attenuates its response to both private information and prices. A “stronger” bidding group - which has more precise private information, faces lower transaction costs, and is more oligopsonistic - has more market power and so will behave competitively only if it receives a higher per capita subsidy rate. When the strong group values the asset no less than the weak group, the expected dead-weight loss increases with the quantity auctioned and also with the degree of payoff asymmetries. Market power and the dead-weight loss may be negatively associated.

Keywords: demand/supply schedule competition, private information, liquidity auctions, treasury auctions, electricity auctions

JEL Classification: D440, D820, G140, E580

Suggested Citation

Manzano, Carolina and Vives, Xavier, Market Power and Welfare in Asymmetric Divisible Good Auctions (December 2016). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 6261. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2909648

Carolina Manzano

Universitat Rovira Virgili ( email )

Tarragona
Spain

Xavier Vives (Contact Author)

University of Navarra - IESE Business School ( email )

Avenida Pearson 21
Barcelona, 08034
Spain

HOME PAGE: http://wwwapp.iese.edu/faculty/facultyDetail.asp?lang=en&prof=xv

Universitat Pompeu Fabra (UPF) ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, 08005
Spain

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research) ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

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