Market Power and Welfare in Asymmetric Divisible Good Auctions

61 Pages Posted: 19 Mar 2020

See all articles by Carolina Manzano

Carolina Manzano

Universitat Rovira Virgili

Xavier Vives

University of Navarra - IESE Business School; Universitat Pompeu Fabra (UPF); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: February 2020

Abstract

We analyze a divisible good uniform-price auction that features two groups each with a finite number of identical bidders and present conditions under which a unique privately revealing equilibrium exists. We derive novel comparative static results highlighting that increases in transaction costs and noise in the signals of a group reinforce each other in making demand schedules of both groups steeper. If the correlation of values of the groups raises, as in a crisis situation, then the illiquidity effect is further reinforced. A “stronger” bidding group - which has more precise private information, faces lower transaction costs, and is more oligopsonistic - has more market power (price impact) and so will behave competitively only if it receives a higher per capita subsidy rate. When the strong group values the asset no less than the weak group, the expected deadweight loss increases with the quantity auctioned and also with the degree of payoff asymmetries. Price impact and the deadweight loss may be negatively associated and market integration may reduce welfare. The results are consistent with the available empirical evidence.

Keywords: demand/supply schedule competition, private information, liquidity auctions, treasury auctions, electricity auctions

JEL Classification: D440, D820, G140, E580

Suggested Citation

Manzano, Carolina and Vives, Xavier, Market Power and Welfare in Asymmetric Divisible Good Auctions (February 2020). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 6261, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2909648

Carolina Manzano

Universitat Rovira Virgili ( email )

Tarragona
Spain

Xavier Vives (Contact Author)

University of Navarra - IESE Business School ( email )

Avenida Pearson 21
Barcelona, 08034
Spain

HOME PAGE: http://wwwapp.iese.edu/faculty/facultyDetail.asp?lang=en&prof=xv

Universitat Pompeu Fabra (UPF) ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, 08005
Spain

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research) ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

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