Is Fiscal Policy Coordination in Emu Desirable?

47 Pages Posted: 20 Nov 2001

See all articles by Roel M. W. J. Beetsma

Roel M. W. J. Beetsma

University of Amsterdam - Research Institute in Economics & Econometrics (RESAM); European Commission; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); Tinbergen Institute - Tinbergen Institute Amsterdam (TIA); Netspar

Xavier Debrun

International Monetary Fund (IMF) - Research Department

Franc Klaassen

University of Amsterdam - Research Institute in Economics & Econometrics (RESAM); Tinbergen Institute

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: October 2001

Abstract

It is widely argued that Europe's unified monetary policy calls for international coordination at the fiscal level. We survey the issues involved with such coordination of fiscal policy as a demand management tool and we use a simple model to investigate the circumstances under which coordination may be desirable. It turns out that coordination is beneficial when the correlation of the shocks hitting the various economies is low. Given the potentially adverse reaction by the ECB (as a result of free-riding and/or a conflict on the orientation of the policy mix), fiscal coordination is likely to be counterproductive when demand or supply shocks are highly symmetric across countries and governments are unable to acquire a strategic leadership position vis-a-vis the ECB. Generally, the scope for fiscal coordination is larger under asymmetric shocks, because the ECB remains passive as average inflation in the union is unaffected. This result contrasts with the more widely held view that the case for international fiscal coordination is strongest under common shocks.

Keywords: EMU, fiscal coordination, shocks, demand management

JEL Classification: E52, E58, E61, E62, E63

Suggested Citation

Beetsma, Roel M. W. J. and Debrun, Xavier and Klaassen, Franc, Is Fiscal Policy Coordination in Emu Desirable? (October 2001). CEPR Discussion Paper No. 3035. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=290967

Roel M. W. J. Beetsma (Contact Author)

University of Amsterdam - Research Institute in Economics & Econometrics (RESAM) ( email )

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Xavier Debrun

International Monetary Fund (IMF) - Research Department ( email )

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Franc Klaassen

University of Amsterdam - Research Institute in Economics & Econometrics (RESAM) ( email )

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+31 20 525 4254 (Fax)

Tinbergen Institute ( email )

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