It's Your Turn: Experiments with Three-Player Public Good Games

32 Pages Posted: 3 Feb 2017 Last revised: 4 Feb 2017

See all articles by Yohanes E. Riyanto

Yohanes E. Riyanto

Nanyang Technological University (NTU) - Division of Economics

Nilanjan Roy

City University of Hong Kong

Date Written: February 3, 2017

Abstract

We report results from experiments designed to investigate the prevalence of turn-taking in three-person finitely repeated threshold public good games without communication. Individuals can each make a discrete contribution. If the number of contributors is at least equal to the threshold, a public benefit accrues to all group members. Players take turns to provide the public good each round when the endowments are homogeneous. When the turn-taking path is at odds with efficiency or under private information of endowments, players seldom engage in taking turns. An endogenous-move protocol limits the frequency of mis-coordinated outcomes every round.

Keywords: Public good provision, Turn-taking, Repeated game, Endogenous move, Experiment

JEL Classification: C72, C92, D03, D82, H41

Suggested Citation

Riyanto, Yohanes E. and Roy, Nilanjan, It's Your Turn: Experiments with Three-Player Public Good Games (February 3, 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2910806 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2910806

Yohanes E. Riyanto

Nanyang Technological University (NTU) - Division of Economics ( email )

HSS 04-53, 14 Nanyang Drive
Singapore, 639798
Singapore

Nilanjan Roy (Contact Author)

City University of Hong Kong ( email )

83 Tat Chee Avenue
Kowloon
Hong Kong

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/site/econnr86/

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