The Bank, the Bond, and the Bail‐Out: On the Legal Construction of Market Discipline in the Eurozone

20 Pages Posted: 6 Feb 2017

See all articles by Harm Schepel

Harm Schepel

University of Kent - Kent Law School

Date Written: March 2017

Abstract

The ‘logic of the market’, so holds the Court of Justice, is the standard of legality of financial assistance to indebted member states under EU law and, ultimately, the legal justification for strict conditionality and the imposition of austerity. This logic of the market, though, is different from actual market behaviour. Austerity, it turns out, is not the inevitable response to market pressures but a function of political substitutes for market discipline (Pringle) and technocratic truth seeking about the ‘correct’ price of debt (Gauweiler) which the Court has frozen into law. The perverse consequence of making the modalities of financial assistance dependent on the ‘logic of the market’ is, moreover, to render the assistance as ineffective and expensive as possible. ‘The logic of the market’ in the Court's case law is best seen as punitive and cynical politics masquerading as inept economics.

Suggested Citation

Schepel, Harm, The Bank, the Bond, and the Bail‐Out: On the Legal Construction of Market Discipline in the Eurozone (March 2017). Journal of Law and Society, Vol. 44, Issue 1, pp. 79-98, 2017, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2911341 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jols.12015

Harm Schepel (Contact Author)

University of Kent - Kent Law School ( email )

Canterbury, Kent CT2 7NS
United Kingdom

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