Coalition Governments and Comparative Constitutional Design

23 Pages Posted: 27 Nov 2001

Date Written: September 2001

Abstract

In this paper we present a structural approach to the study of government formation in multi party parliamentary democracies. The approach is based on the estimation of a stochastic bargaining model which we use to investigate the effects of specific institutional features of parliamentary democracy on the formation and dissolution of coalition governments. We illustrate our methodology by presenting the results of two (counterfactual) experiments of comparative constitutional design.

Keywords: Political Stability, Minority Coalitions, Government Formation, Government Dissolution, Bicameralism, Constitutions

JEL Classification: D72, H19, C73

Suggested Citation

Diermeier, Daniel and Eraslan, Hulya and Merlo, Antonio M., Coalition Governments and Comparative Constitutional Design (September 2001). PIER Working Paper No. 01-041. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=291168 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.291168

Daniel Diermeier

Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management ( email )

2001 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208
United States

Hulya Eraslan

Rice University ( email )

Department of Economics MS-22
Rice University P.O Box 1892
Houston, TX Texas 77251-1892
United States
7133483453 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://he6.web.rice.edu/

Antonio M. Merlo (Contact Author)

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics ( email )

Ronald O. Perelman Center for Political Science
133 South 36th Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297
United States
215-898-7933 (Phone)
215-573-2057 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.ssc.upenn.edu/~merloa

Rice University ( email )

6100 South Main Street
Houston, TX 77005-1892
United States

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
236
Abstract Views
2,216
rank
128,681
PlumX Metrics