A New Institutional Economics Approach to Contracts and Cooperatives
19 Pages Posted: 19 Nov 2001
There are 2 versions of this paper
A New Institutional Economics Approach to Contracts and Cooperatives
Date Written: September 2001
Abstract
Our purpose in this paper is to highlight the role of organizational structure and incentives in the design of contracts between buyers and sellers of agricultural products. In particular, we consider how differences between investor-owned (IOF) and producer-oriented (POF) firms, and differences between alternate types of POFs, may affect the types of contract terms those respective organizations are likely to prefer in their contracts with agricultural producers. New institutional economics theories of contracting, agency and property rights allocation suggest that cooperative contractors may be able to design contracts that enhance economic efficiency that IOFs cannot easily replicate.
Keywords: Contracting, cooperatives, organizational structure
Keywords: Contracting, cooperatives, organizational structure
JEL Classification: L14, L21, Q13
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?
Recommended Papers
-
A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law
By Margaret M. Blair and Lynn A. Stout
-
Norms and the Theory of the Firm
By Oliver Hart
-
Norms and the Theory of the Firm
By Oliver Hart
-
The Essential Role of Organizational Law
By Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman
-
Direct and Indirect Bargaining Costs and the Scope of the Firm
By Marc Knez and Duncan Simester
-
The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and Law
By Dan M. Kahan
-
The Coming Transformation of Shareholder Value
By Simon Deakin
-
Corporate Governance, Institutional Investors and Conflicts of Interest