Cultural Norms and Identity in Coordination Games

42 Pages Posted: 6 Feb 2017

See all articles by Jo Laban Peryman

Jo Laban Peryman

Behavioural Business Lab, RMIT University

David Kelsey

University of Exeter Business School - Department of Economics

Date Written: November 2, 2016

Abstract

We ran experiments with a stag hunt and bargaining coordination game. Using a between-subjects design, we varied the identity of the opponent between someone of the same culture or a different culture. The idea was to see whether cultural norms or identity played a part in coordination decisions. We compared the responses of British and East Asian students at the University of Exeter and showed the cultural identity of the opponent by physical appearance. The players appeared to use cultural stereotypes to predict behaviour, especially in the bargaining game which may require more strategic thought than the stag hunt game. In particular, the British acted as though Asians would behave more cautiously than other British. According to our results, the stereotype of Asians being cautious is misleading.

Keywords: culture, identity, norms, coordination

JEL Classification: C70, Z13

Suggested Citation

Laban Peryman, Jo and Kelsey, David, Cultural Norms and Identity in Coordination Games (November 2, 2016). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2911986 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2911986

Jo Laban Peryman (Contact Author)

Behavioural Business Lab, RMIT University ( email )

445 Swanston Street
Melbourne, 3000
Australia

David Kelsey

University of Exeter Business School - Department of Economics ( email )

Streatham Court
Exeter, Devon EX4 4PU
United Kingdom
013 9226 2536 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://people.exeter.ac.uk/dk210/

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