To Be (Unionized) or Not to Be? A Case for Cost-Raising Strategies

23 Pages Posted: 25 Nov 2001

See all articles by Jacques R. Bughin

Jacques R. Bughin

Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) - European Center for Advanced Research in Economics and Statistics (ECORE) ; McKinsey & Company

Stefano Vannini

University of Vienna

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: December 1996

Abstract

This paper analyses the decision by a firm over whether or not to recognize unions (and therefore enter the bargaining process) in order to gain market power in unionized markets. We show that union power coupled with the nature of the union-firm bargaining process - i.e. scope and structure - are key determinants of a firm's choice to be unionized and to strategically adopt cost-raising strategies.

Keywords: Cost-raising strategies, union-firm bargaining

JEL Classification: J51, L20

Suggested Citation

Bughin, Jacques R. and Vannini, Stefano, To Be (Unionized) or Not to Be? A Case for Cost-Raising Strategies (December 1996). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=291205

Jacques R. Bughin (Contact Author)

Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) - European Center for Advanced Research in Economics and Statistics (ECORE) ( email )

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Stefano Vannini

University of Vienna ( email )

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