A Game Model of Optimal Apartment Cleaning by College Students

RIT Economics Department Working Paper No. 17-3

10 Pages Posted: 8 Feb 2017

See all articles by Amitrajeet A. Batabyal

Amitrajeet A. Batabyal

Rochester Institute of Technology (RIT) - Department of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: February 7, 2017

Abstract

In this note we use a static game model to analyze the optimal cleanup of an apartment that is shared by two college students. Both students dislike cleaning. However, they also prefer a clean apartment to a dirty one. Student i 's utility function embodies the idea that the more time one student spends cleaning, the less valuable is the time spent cleaning by the other student. In this setting, we first determine the best response function of each student (player) i where i = 1,2. Second, we determine the cleaning time choices that survive one round of the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies (IESDS). Finally, we ascertain the cleaning time choices that survive all rounds of IESDS.

Keywords: Apartment, Cleanup, College Student, Static Game, Strictly Dominated Strategy

JEL Classification: J22, D01, C72

Suggested Citation

Batabyal, Amitrajeet A., A Game Model of Optimal Apartment Cleaning by College Students (February 7, 2017). RIT Economics Department Working Paper No. 17-3. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2913085 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2913085

Amitrajeet A. Batabyal (Contact Author)

Rochester Institute of Technology (RIT) - Department of Economics ( email )

92 Lomb Memorial Drive
Rochester, NY 14623-5604
United States
585-475-2805 (Phone)
585-475-5777 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://people.rit.edu/aabgsh

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