An Economic Framework for Retransmission Consent

Phoenix Center Policy Paper Number 47

40 Pages Posted: 8 Feb 2017

See all articles by T. Randolph Beard

T. Randolph Beard

Auburn University

George S. Ford

Phoenix Center for Advanced Legal & Economic Public Policy Studies

Lawrence J. Spiwak

Phoenix Center for Advanced Legal & Economic Public Policy Studies

Michael L. Stern

Auburn University; Phoenix Center for Advanced Legal & Economic Public Policy Studies

Date Written: December 2013

Abstract

With the rising cost of broadcast programming and the high-profile of “blackouts,” Retransmission Consent has earned a place at the forefront of the modern communications policy debate. To provide a framework under which to evaluate the issue, we present in this PAPER an economic theory of Retransmission Consent. Taking into account the social contract between the government and broadcasters to serve the “public interest” (e.g., provide “local” programming and a “diversity of voices” to as many Americans as possible), we show that the “market” outcome for the license fee under the Retransmission Consent paradigm may not be socially efficient. Broadcast regulation creates a type of positive information externality, and private transactions do not typically account for externalities, meaning the market price for the retransmission fee is theoretically “too high,” both relative to the socially-optimal price and the market price of an otherwise-equivalent cable network. This “spread,” which we do not quantify, is a consequence of a disharmony between the historical and continuing policy of the broadcast social contract and the “market” approach embodied in the Retransmission Consent regime. In light of our findings, we review some of the policy proposals to modify Retransmission Consent. We find that because it is public policy that has caused the conflict, proposals to move to a less-regulated broadcasting market may be sensible, but it remains to be seen whether or not such legislative fixes sufficiently address the efficiency issue revealed by our theoretical model.

Keywords: Television, Broadcasting, Regulation, Retransmission Consent, Cable Television

JEL Classification: L96

Suggested Citation

Beard, T. Randolph and Ford, George S. and Spiwak, Lawrence J. and Stern, Michael L., An Economic Framework for Retransmission Consent (December 2013). Phoenix Center Policy Paper Number 47. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2913135 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2913135

T. Randolph Beard

Auburn University

415 West Magnolia Avenue
Auburn, AL 36849
United States

George S. Ford (Contact Author)

Phoenix Center for Advanced Legal & Economic Public Policy Studies ( email )

5335 Wisconsin Avenue, NW
Suite 440
Washington, DC 20015
United States

Lawrence J. Spiwak

Phoenix Center for Advanced Legal & Economic Public Policy Studies ( email )

5335 Wisconsin Avenue, NW
Suite 440
Washington, DC 20015
United States
202-274-0235 (Phone)
202-318-4909 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.phoenix-center.org

Michael L. Stern

Auburn University ( email )

415 West Magnolia Avenue
Auburn, AL 36849
United States

Phoenix Center for Advanced Legal & Economic Public Policy Studies

5335 Wisconsin Avenue, NW
Suite 440
Washington, DC 20015
United States

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