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Property in Bribes Revisited in a Cross-Disciplinary Perspective

38 Pages Posted: 8 Feb 2017  

Yock Lin Tan

National University of Singapore (NUS) - Faculty of Law

Date Written: February 8, 2017

Abstract

Taking its point of departure from the decision in FHR European Ventures LLP v Cedar Capital Partners LLC, this article seeks to bring cross-disciplinary perspectives to bear on the question whether an agent should hold the bribe he has received on constructive trust for his principal. Two methods or models, the economising and the principal agent models, were employed. The results were at least three-fold. First, an effective legal rule responding to the problem of harm caused by corruption must recognise and take account of differences between competitive and non-competitive environments, auditing possibilities, as well as multiple causalities, both individual and institutional. Second, a property rule fails to do that. Third, ignoring such endogenous and exogenous variables, it overestimates or underestimates the harm suffered by victims of corruption.

Keywords: property rule, bribe, principal and agent, Calabresi and Melamed efficiency model, market efficiency, autonomy and accountability, principal agent model

Suggested Citation

Tan, Yock Lin, Property in Bribes Revisited in a Cross-Disciplinary Perspective (February 8, 2017). NUS Law Working Paper No. 2016/011. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2913963

Yock Lin Tan (Contact Author)

National University of Singapore (NUS) - Faculty of Law ( email )

469G Bukit Timah Road
Eu Tong Sen Building
Singapore, 259776
Singapore

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