Medieval Representative Assemblies: Collective Action and Antecedents of Limited Government

39 Pages Posted: 9 Feb 2017 Last revised: 1 Feb 2018

See all articles by Alexander William Salter

Alexander William Salter

Texas Tech University - Rawls College of Business; American Institute for Economic Research

Andrew T. Young

Texas Tech University - Rawls College of Business

Date Written: January 31, 2018

Abstract

Medieval monarchs in Western Europe responded to financial and military pressures by instituting representative assemblies. Three estates (classes; orders) were represented in these assemblies: clergy, nobility, and burghers. In the late medieval and early modern periods, some states tended towards absolutism (e.g., France); others towards constitutional monarchy (e.g., England). The German historian Otto Hintze conjectured that two-chamber assemblies were more likely to resist monarchical encroachments on their political authority than three-chamber assemblies. We argue that the two- versus three-chamber distinction is coincidental to what was truly relevant: whether chambers were estate-based or had mixed representation from multiple estates. We provide a comparative institutional analysis that emphasizes political bargaining and the costs of expressing special versus common interests. This analysis suggests that mixed representation assemblies, all else equal, provided a stronger check on absolutism than their estate-based counterparts. We also provide historical case studies of France and England that lend insights into why an estate-based Estates General arose in the former, while a mixed representation Parliament arose in the latter.

Keywords: medieval economic history, comparative economic development, medieval constitution, polycentric governance, political property rights, representative assemblies

JEL Classification: N44, O10, O52, P50, K00

Suggested Citation

Salter, Alexander William and Young, Andrew T., Medieval Representative Assemblies: Collective Action and Antecedents of Limited Government (January 31, 2018). Constitutional Political Economy, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2914383 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2914383

Alexander William Salter (Contact Author)

Texas Tech University - Rawls College of Business ( email )

Lubbock, TX 79409
United States

HOME PAGE: http://awsalter.com

American Institute for Economic Research

PO Box 1000
Great Barrington, MA 01230
United States

Andrew T. Young

Texas Tech University - Rawls College of Business ( email )

Lubbock, TX 79409
United States

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