Sovereign Debt-Ceiling Rules in the Spanish and Hungarian Constitutions and Their Interplay with the Relevant EU Laws

Proceedings of the International Conference on Trade, Business, Economics and Law, ICTBEL 2015 (Oxford) Conference Proceedings, St Anne’s College, Oxford, United Kingdom, November 16th 18th, 2015; ISBN: 978-0-9930368-9-7

12 Pages Posted: 10 Feb 2017 Last revised: 19 Apr 2018

See all articles by Virág Ilona Blazsek

Virág Ilona Blazsek

United Nations Joint Staff Pension Fund - Office of Investment Management; George Washington University Law School

Date Written: December 1, 2015

Abstract

The paper builds upon the findings of Julia Black (2010) about the constitutional dimension of managing the financial crisis, and applies those findings to the context of Spain and Hungary. In particular it focuses on one of the recent quintessential EU agenda items, the constitutional debt-ceiling rules, and answers the question; how these rules interplay with the forming EU rescue mechanism for failing banks. It interprets the Spanish and Hungarian developments not only as a response to the requirements set out on a supranational level, but also as part of the post-crisis architecture of economic governance and the forming bank union. Either it is a Eurozone country like Spain or a non-Eurozone country like Hungary, these new constitutional provisions contribute to the strengthening of the EU and support the creation of a common economic policy. The sooner this happens the better it will enhance the global competitiveness of the EU.

Keywords: Eurozone, European Stability Mechanism, financial crisis, sovereign debt, bank bailouts

Suggested Citation

Blazsek, Virág Ilona, Sovereign Debt-Ceiling Rules in the Spanish and Hungarian Constitutions and Their Interplay with the Relevant EU Laws (December 1, 2015). Proceedings of the International Conference on Trade, Business, Economics and Law, ICTBEL 2015 (Oxford) Conference Proceedings, St Anne’s College, Oxford, United Kingdom, November 16th 18th, 2015; ISBN: 978-0-9930368-9-7, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2914758

Virág Ilona Blazsek (Contact Author)

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