Institutions and Elites: Property, Contract, the State, and Rights in Information in the Global Economy

11 Pages Posted: 21 Nov 2001

See all articles by Paul B. Stephan

Paul B. Stephan

University of Virginia School of Law

Date Written: December 2001

Abstract

This paper examines the interplay between intellectual property rules and forces driving globalization in the world economy. It argues against the view that multilateral enforcement of standardized intellectual property rules offers the greatest promise for further development. I argue that standardization obtained through international institutions such as the World Trade Organization or the United Nation's World Intellectual Property Organization offer rent-seeking opportunities to affected industries. The drive toward a collective outcome, and particularly the linkage between intellectual property harmonization and cooperation on other issues, undermines the ability of dissenting governments to withhold approval. Nor does judicially developed harmonization hold out much promise. Instead, I argue, local autonomy in developing intellectual property rules and private party autonomy in choosing intellectual property regimes can work in tandem as a regime most likely to enhance the welfare benefits of these rights.

Suggested Citation

Stephan, Paul B., Institutions and Elites: Property, Contract, the State, and Rights in Information in the Global Economy (December 2001). Cardozo Journal of International and Comparative Law, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=291544 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.291544

Paul B. Stephan (Contact Author)

University of Virginia School of Law ( email )

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