Spread Bancário E Enforcement Contratual: Hipótese De Causalidade Reversa E Evidência Empírica (Banking Spread and Contractual Enforcement: Hypothesis of Reversal Causality and Empirical Evidence)

FGV Direito SP Research Paper Series No. 148

Revista Brasileira de Economia

39 Pages Posted: 13 Feb 2017 Last revised: 6 Jun 2017

See all articles by Bruno Meyerhof Salama

Bruno Meyerhof Salama

University of California, Berkeley - School of Law; Fundação Getulio Vargas Law School at São Paulo

Date Written: February 13, 2017

Abstract

Portuguese Abstract: O consenso da literatura é o de que o baixo nível de enforcement dos contratos e garantias seja uma causa importante do alto spread bancário no Brasil. No entanto, por conta de uma dinâmica de causalidade reversa, pode haver uma endogeneidade na estimação deste efeito causal. O presente trabalho formula esta hipótese, apresenta evidência empírica preliminar e retira implicações normativas. Ao final, apresenta lições úteis para a análise econômica do direito e do Poder Judiciário.

English Abstract: The consensus in the literature is that the low level of enforcement of contracts and guarantees is an important cause of Brazil’s high banking spreads. There may however be an endogeneity problem in the estimation of this causal effect due to reverse causality. This paper formulates this hypothesis, presents preliminary empirical evidence and draws normative implications. At the end, it presents useful lessons for economic analysis of law and of the Judiciary Power.

Note: Downloadable document is in Portuguese.

Keywords: Spread Bancário, Viés Judicial, Direito e Economia

JEL Classification: K12, D86

Suggested Citation

Meyerhof Salama, Bruno, Spread Bancário E Enforcement Contratual: Hipótese De Causalidade Reversa E Evidência Empírica (Banking Spread and Contractual Enforcement: Hypothesis of Reversal Causality and Empirical Evidence) (February 13, 2017). FGV Direito SP Research Paper Series No. 148. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2916275 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2916275

Bruno Meyerhof Salama (Contact Author)

University of California, Berkeley - School of Law ( email )

2240 Piedmont Ave. Berkeley
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States

Fundação Getulio Vargas Law School at São Paulo ( email )

R. Rocha, 233, Bela Vista
São Paulo, 01330-000
Brazil

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