The Political Economy of Choice of Law

14 Pages Posted: 21 Nov 2001

See all articles by Paul B. Stephan

Paul B. Stephan

University of Virginia School of Law

Abstract

This paper will be published in the Georgetown Law Journal as one of two responses to an essay by Andrew Guzman on the law and economics of choice of law. Guzman offers a welfare analysis that advances the analysis of allocation of regulatory jurisdiction. He criticism of traditional modes of expounding choice of law doctrine is, if anything, insufficiently damning. I argue, however, that by failing to take public choice factors into account, Guzman's normative analysis may place too great confidence in the ability of multilateral, multi-tasked organizations such as the WTO to coordinate the allocation of regulatory jurisdiction.

Suggested Citation

Stephan, Paul B., The Political Economy of Choice of Law. Georgetown Law Journal. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=291655 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.291655

Paul B. Stephan (Contact Author)

University of Virginia School of Law ( email )

580 Massie Road
Charlottesville, VA 22903
United States
434-924-7098 (Phone)
434-924-7536 (Fax)

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
341
Abstract Views
1,941
rank
94,037
PlumX Metrics