Using Employer Hiring Behavior to Test the Educational Signaling Hypothesis

21 Pages Posted: 26 Nov 2001

See all articles by James Albrecht

James Albrecht

Georgetown University - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Jan C. van Ours

Tilburg University - Department of Economics; University of Melbourne - Department of Economics

Date Written: November 2001

Abstract

This paper presents a test of the educational signaling hypothesis. If employers use education as a signal in the hiring process, they will rely more on education when less is otherwise known about applicants. We find that employers are more likely to lower educational standards when an informal, more informative recruitment channel is used, so we conclude that education is used as a signal in the hiring process.

Keywords: Recruitment, Signaling

JEL Classification: I20

Suggested Citation

Albrecht, James W. and van Ours, Jan C., Using Employer Hiring Behavior to Test the Educational Signaling Hypothesis (November 2001). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=291722 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.291722

James W. Albrecht

Georgetown University - Department of Economics ( email )

Washington, DC 20057
United States
202-687-6105 (Phone)
202-687-6102 (Fax)

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Jan C. Van Ours (Contact Author)

Tilburg University - Department of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
+31 13 466 2880 (Phone)
+31 13 466 3042 (Fax)

University of Melbourne - Department of Economics ( email )

Melbourne, 3010
Australia

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