Forthcoming, Journal of International Economic Law
66 Pages Posted: 16 Feb 2017 Last revised: 7 Aug 2017
Date Written: February 15, 2017
The internationalization of China’s currency, the renminbi (“RMB”), is arising in ways that depart considerably from historical precedent and what “law and macroeconomic” theory would predict. Instead of waiting for international markets for its currency to evolve organically, the Chinese government has undertaken a quasi-mercantilist strategy designed to promote the currency and its own national RMB-based infrastructure. This strategy has emphasized tightly managed capital account deregulation over prudential reforms and robust market supervision, and incentivizes foreign jurisdictions to compete for RMB-based transactions.
China’s monetary strategy introduces novel systemic risks to the global financial system, including a potentially inadequate provision of renminbi liquidity, a regulatory race to the bottom between offshore RMB-hubs, and significant transmission belts of financial risk to even non-renminbi markets. To mitigate these risks, this Article outlines a policy recipe of stronger macroprudential oversight, transparent countercyclical capital account reforms and credible commitments to refrain from competitive currency devaluations.
Keywords: renminbi, systemic risk, currency manipulation, financial regulation, central banking
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Brummer, Chris, The Renminbi and Systemic Risk (February 15, 2017). Forthcoming, Journal of International Economic Law. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2918257 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2918257