Effect of Entrant and Incumbent Bidding on Public Procurement Efficiency

31 Pages Posted: 16 Feb 2017 Last revised: 1 Apr 2017

See all articles by Bedri Kamil Onur Tas

Bedri Kamil Onur Tas

TOBB University of Economics and Technology - Department of Economics; Economic Research Forum (ERF)

Date Written: March 30, 2017

Abstract

We empirically investigate the effect of entrants and incumbents on the efficiency of public procurement auctions. We use a unique data set that covers all Turkish public procurement auctions for the years 2004 to 2010. We find that procurement prices of auctions won by entrants are significantly lower. The survival analysis of entrants show that more than half of the entrants cannot survive in the public procurement market and cannot win more than one auction. The average number of wins by incumbent firms is ten compared to three by entrant firms.

Keywords: Public Procurement Auctions, Competition

JEL Classification: C36, D44, H57

Suggested Citation

Tas, Bedri Kamil Onur, Effect of Entrant and Incumbent Bidding on Public Procurement Efficiency (March 30, 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2918781 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2918781

Bedri Kamil Onur Tas (Contact Author)

TOBB University of Economics and Technology - Department of Economics ( email )

Sogutozu Cad. No:43 Sogutozu
Ankara, 06560
Turkey

HOME PAGE: http://onurtas.weebly.com

Economic Research Forum (ERF) ( email )

21 Al-Sad Al-Aaly St.
(P.O. Box: 12311)
Dokki, Cairo
Egypt

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