Download this Paper Open PDF in Browser

대마불사 종식을 위한 베일인 (Bail-In) 제도 도입방향(Bail-In to End The ‘Too Big to Fail’ Dilemma)

9 Pages Posted: 17 Feb 2017  

Sunjoo Hwang

Korea Development Institute (KDI)

Date Written: February 16, 2017


The English version of this paper can be found at

Korean Abstract: 베일인(bail–in)은 은행의 주주와 채권자가 손실을 분담하는 방식으로 부실은행을 정리하는 제도로, 은행의 도덕적 해이와 국가의 재정위기를 야기하는 구제금융(bail–out)을 대체하기 위해 도입되었다. 그러나 채권자의 상당수가 일반 국민인 경우, 정부는 베일인 제도에도 불구하고 구제금융을 선택할 가능성이 높다. 따라서 베일인 제도의 실효성을 높이기 위해서는 예금 채권 우선변제, 준칙형 코코본드 등 보완책을 마련하는 것이 필수적이다.

English Abstract: Designed to resolve failed banks via loss-sharing by shareholders and creditors, bail-ins were introduced to substitute bailouts, which are known to create moral hazards in banks and a crisis in national finance. However, in cases wherein the majority of creditors are the general public, governments are still more inclined to bail out, despite the bail-in instruments being available. To increase the effectiveness of bail-ins, supplementary methods, such as depositor preference and contingent convertible bonds (CoCo bonds) with rule-based triggers, are needed.

Notes: Downloadable document is in Korean.

Suggested Citation

Hwang, Sunjoo, 대마불사 종식을 위한 베일인 (Bail-In) 제도 도입방향(Bail-In to End The ‘Too Big to Fail’ Dilemma) (February 16, 2017). KDI FOCUS (No. 80, kor.) . Available at SSRN:

Sunjoo Hwang (Contact Author)

Korea Development Institute (KDI) ( email )

263 Namsejong-ro
Sejong-si 30149
Korea, Republic of (South Korea)

Paper statistics

Abstract Views