Positive and Normative Models of Procedural Rights: An Integrative Approach to Administrative Procedures

Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization VI (1990)

26 Pages Posted: 18 Feb 2017

See all articles by McNollgast

McNollgast

Duke University - Department of Political Science; Stanford University - Department of Political Science; Stanford University - Department of Economics

Barry R. Weingast

Stanford University, Department of Political Science

Roger G. Noll

Stanford University - Department of Economics

Date Written: January 1, 1990

Abstract

The gulf between legal ideals and reductionist PPT provides a challenge for PPT: Is PPT necessarily reductionist, arguing that legal realism is misconceived and irrelevant? If not reductionist, then how are the two to be integrated in a manner that does more than give lip service to legal idealists? Our answer is that the two approaches can be integrated. Attention to normative issues by reelection-minded politicians can explain self-imposed procedural limits, such as those enacted in the Administrative Procedure Act, by noting that such limits serve political ends as well as normative ones.

Keywords: Congress, administration, procedure, regulation, atomic energy

Suggested Citation

McNollgast and Weingast, Barry R. and Noll, Roger G., Positive and Normative Models of Procedural Rights: An Integrative Approach to Administrative Procedures (January 1, 1990). Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization VI (1990) . Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2919195

McNollgast (Contact Author)

Duke University - Department of Political Science ( email )

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Stanford University - Department of Political Science ( email )

Stanford, CA 94305
United States

Stanford University - Department of Economics ( email )

Landau Economics Building
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Stanford, CA 94305-6072
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Barry R. Weingast

Stanford University, Department of Political Science ( email )

Stanford, CA 94305-6010
United States
650-723-0497 (Phone)
650-723-1808 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.stanford.edu/group/mcnollgast/cgi-bin/wordpress/

Roger G. Noll

Stanford University - Department of Economics ( email )

Landau Economics Building
579 Serra Mall
Stanford, CA 94305-6072
United States
650-723-2297 (Phone)
650-725-5702 (Fax)

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