58 Pages Posted: 17 Feb 2017
Date Written: February 17, 2017
Fixing a game with uncertain payoffs, information design identifies the information structure and equilibrium that maximizes the payoff of an information designer. We show how this perspective unifies existing work, including that on communication in games (Myerson (1991)), Bayesian persuasion (Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011)) and some of our own recent work. Information design has a literal interpretation, under which there is a real information designer who can commit to the choice of the best information structure (from her perspective) for a set of participants in a game. We emphasize a metaphorical interpretation, under which the information design problem is used by the analyst to characterize play in the game under many different information structures.
Keywords: Information design, Bayesian persuasion, correlated equilibrium, incomplete information, robust predictions, information structure
JEL Classification: C72, D82, D83
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Bergemann, Dirk and Morris, Stephen, Information Design: A Unified Perspective (February 17, 2017). Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2075. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2919675