Rationalizability and Nash Equilibria in Guessing Games
18 Pages Posted: 18 Feb 2017 Last revised: 3 Aug 2017
Date Written: June 7, 2017
Abstract
Games in which players aim to guess a fraction or multiple p of the average guess are known as guessing games or (p-)beauty contests. In this note, we derive a full characterization of the set of rationalizable strategies and the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria for such games as a function of the parameter p, the number of players and the (discrete) set of available guesses to each player.
Keywords: Guessing game, Beauty contest, Rationalizability
JEL Classification: C70, C72
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Seel, Christian and Tsakas, Elias, Rationalizability and Nash Equilibria in Guessing Games (June 7, 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2919705 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2919705
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