Firms' Internal Networks and Local Economic Shocks

51 Pages Posted: 21 Feb 2017

See all articles by Xavier Giroud

Xavier Giroud

Columbia Business School - Finance and Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Holger M. Mueller

New York University (NYU) - Department of Finance; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: February 2017

Abstract

This paper shows that firms spread the adverse impacts of local employment shocks across regions through their internal networks of establishments. Linking confidential micro data at the establishment level from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Longitudinal Business Database to ZIP code-level variation in house price changes during the Great Recession, we find that local establishment-level employment responds strongly to employment shocks in other regions in which the firm has establishments. Consistent with theory, the elasticity of establishment-level employment with respect to shocks in other regions is increasing with firms’ financial constraints. Moreover, establishments belonging to more expansive firm networks exhibit smaller employment elasticities with respect to their own local shocks. To account for the impacts of general equilibrium adjustments, we examine aggregate employment at the county level. Similar to what we found at the establishment level, we obtain large elasticities of county-level employment with respect to employment shocks in other counties linked through firms’ internal networks. Overall, our results suggest that firms play an important role in the provision of regional risk sharing and the propagation of local employment shocks across different U.S. regions.

Suggested Citation

Giroud, Xavier and Mueller, Holger M., Firms' Internal Networks and Local Economic Shocks (February 2017). NBER Working Paper No. w23176, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2920394

Xavier Giroud (Contact Author)

Columbia Business School - Finance and Economics ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://www.columbia.edu/~xg2285/

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Holger M. Mueller

New York University (NYU) - Department of Finance ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://www.stern.nyu.edu/~hmueller/

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

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