Competition Policy and Agreements between Firms

CMPO Working Paper No. 01/034

38 Pages Posted: 30 Nov 2001

See all articles by Fabian Berges-Sennou

Fabian Berges-Sennou

INRA-ESR

Frederic Loss

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Financial Markets Group

Estelle Malavolti-Grimal

University of Toulouse 1 - Groupe de Recherche en Economie Mathématique et Quantitative (GREMAQ)

Thibaud Verge

University of Bristol - Leverhulme Centre for Market and Public Organisation (CMPO)

Date Written: August 2001

Abstract

The European Commission recently considered abolishing the notification system and focusing on a regime of ex post investigations.

Our objective is to show that a better understanding of markets can justify this reform. When the precision of the competition authority's analysis is not high enough, an ex ante control, like the notification system, is preferable. On the other hand, if the decision accuracy improves, an ex post regime achieves a higher social welfare.

Keywords: Competition Policy, Agreements, Imperfect Auditing

JEL Classification: L4, D8

Suggested Citation

Berges-Sennou, Fabian and Loss, Frederic and Malavolti-Grimal, Estelle and Verge, Thibaud, Competition Policy and Agreements between Firms (August 2001). CMPO Working Paper No. 01/034, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=292080 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.292080

Fabian Berges-Sennou

INRA-ESR ( email )

Univeriste des Sciences Sociales
21, Allee de Brienne
Toulouse 31000
France

Frederic Loss

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Financial Markets Group ( email )

Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom
+44 2078523569 (Phone)

Estelle Malavolti-Grimal

University of Toulouse 1 - Groupe de Recherche en Economie Mathématique et Quantitative (GREMAQ) ( email )

Manufacture des Tabacs
21 Allees de Brienne Universite des Sciences Sociales
31000 Toulouse
France
+33 5 61 12 85 83 (Phone)
+33 5 61 22 55 63 (Fax)

Thibaud Verge (Contact Author)

University of Bristol - Leverhulme Centre for Market and Public Organisation (CMPO) ( email )

12 Priory Road
Bristol BS8 1TN
United Kingdom
+44 117 928 9844 (Phone)
+44 117 928 8577 (Fax)

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