Gender Homophily in Referral Networks: Consequences for the Medicare Physician Earnings Gap

Zeltzer, Dan. 2020. "Gender Homophily in Referral Networks: Consequences for the Medicare Physician Earnings Gap." American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 12 (2): 169-97. DOI: 10.1257/app.20180201

56 Pages Posted: 23 Feb 2017 Last revised: 30 Mar 2020

See all articles by Dan Zeltzer

Dan Zeltzer

Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: February 28, 2019

Abstract

I assess the extent to which the gender gap in physician earnings may be driven by physicians’ preference for referring to specialists of the same gender. Analyzing administrative data on 100 million Medicare patient referrals, I provide robust evidence that doctors refer more to specialists of their same gender. I show that biased referrals are predominantly driven by physicians’ decisions rather than by endogenous sorting of physicians or patients. Because most referring doctors are male, the net impact of same-gender bias by both male and female doctors generates lower demand for female relative to male specialists, pointing to a positive externality for increased female participation in medicine.

Keywords: Networks, Referrals, Gender Gap, Physician Markets

JEL Classification: I11, J16, L14

Suggested Citation

Zeltzer, Dan, Gender Homophily in Referral Networks: Consequences for the Medicare Physician Earnings Gap (February 28, 2019). Zeltzer, Dan. 2020. "Gender Homophily in Referral Networks: Consequences for the Medicare Physician Earnings Gap." American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 12 (2): 169-97. DOI: 10.1257/app.20180201, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2921482 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2921482

Dan Zeltzer (Contact Author)

Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 39040
Ramat Aviv, Tel Aviv, 69978
Israel
+972(3)640-5824 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.tau.ac.il/~dzeltzer

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