Monetary Constraints, Spending, and Autocratic Survival in Party-Based Regimes

36 Pages Posted: 23 Feb 2017

See all articles by Cristina Bodea

Cristina Bodea

Michigan State University

Masaaki Higashijima

Tohoku University; Tohoku University

Ana Carolina Garriga

University of Essex - Department of Government; Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas (CIDE)

Date Written: February 22, 2017

Abstract

In dominant party regimes, party cadres’ participation in decision-making constrains dictators from arbitrarily changing policy. Party based regimes are also better at mobilizing supporters in exchange for extensive patronage. The conventional wisdom is that these two mechanisms work together to prolong dominant party regimes. However, under certain conditions, the elite-level constraints restrict autocratic leaders’ ability to engage in patronage distribution. We focus on monetary institutions, arguing that when central bank independence overlaps with the collective decision-making in dominant party regimes, dictators have diminished control over the central bank. Thus the central bank is effective enough to restrict expansionary fiscal policy, reducing the mobilization of supporters through patronage and increasing authoritarian breakdown risk. Analyses on data from 1970 to 2012 in 94 autocracies find that high central bank independence in dominant party regimes increases the likelihood of breakdown. Moreover, independent central banks in party-based autocracies contribute to lower fiscal expenditures.

Keywords: Dominant Party Regimes, Autocratic Survival, Central Bank Independence, Spending

JEL Classification: E5, H4, H5

Suggested Citation

Bodea, Cristina and Higashijima, Masaaki and Garriga, Ana Carolina, Monetary Constraints, Spending, and Autocratic Survival in Party-Based Regimes (February 22, 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2921818 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2921818

Cristina Bodea (Contact Author)

Michigan State University ( email )

Agriculture Hall
East Lansing, MI 48824-1122
United States

Masaaki Higashijima

Tohoku University ( email )

SKK Building, Katahira 2
Aoba-ku, Sendai, Miyagi 980-8577
Japan

Tohoku University ( email )

Aramaki aza Aoba 6-3-09
Aoba-ku
Sendai, Miyagi 980-8579
Japan
8109094245721 (Phone)

Ana Carolina Garriga

University of Essex - Department of Government ( email )

Wivenhoe Park
Colchester CO4 3SQ, CO4 3SQ
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.essex.ac.uk/people/garri79407/carolina-garriga

Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas (CIDE) ( email )

Carretera México-Toluca 3655
Col. Lomas de Santa Fe
Mexico City, Mexico 01210
Mexico
5727-9800 (Phone)

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
65
rank
335,082
Abstract Views
615
PlumX Metrics