Time vs. State in Insurance: Experimental Evidence from Contract Farming in Kenya

University of Zurich, UBS International Center of Economics in Society, Working Paper No. 18

84 Pages Posted: 22 Feb 2017

See all articles by Lorenzo Casaburi

Lorenzo Casaburi

University of Zurich; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Jack Willis

Harvard University - Department of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: December 2016

Abstract

The gains from insurance arise from the transfer of income across states. Yet, by requiring that the premium be paid upfront, standard insurance products also transfer income across time. We show that this intertemporal transfer can help explain low insurance demand, especially among the poor, and in a randomized control trial in Kenya we test a crop insurance product which removes it. The product is interlinked with a contract farming scheme: as with other inputs, the buyer of the crop offers the insurance and deducts the premium from farmer revenues at harvest time. The take-up rate is 72%, compared to 5% for the standard upfront contract, and take-up is highest among poorer farmers. Additional experiments and outcomes indicate that liquidity constraints, present bias, and counterparty risk are all important constraints on the demand for standard insurance. Finally, evidence from a natural experiment in the United States, exploiting a change in the timing of the premium payment for Federal Crop Insurance, shows that the transfer across time also affects insurance adoption in developed countries.

Keywords: Insurance, income transfer, development economics, contract farming

JEL Classification: D81, O13, O55

Suggested Citation

Casaburi, Lorenzo and Willis, Jack, Time vs. State in Insurance: Experimental Evidence from Contract Farming in Kenya (December 2016). University of Zurich, UBS International Center of Economics in Society, Working Paper No. 18, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2922028 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2922028

Lorenzo Casaburi (Contact Author)

University of Zurich ( email )

Rämistrasse 71
Zürich, CH-8006
Switzerland

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Jack Willis

Harvard University - Department of Economics ( email )

Littauer Center
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
75
Abstract Views
555
rank
383,853
PlumX Metrics