The Imposition of 'Follow-On Penalties' on Managers and Employees

13(2) Competition Law Review (2018) 139-161

23 Pages Posted: 24 Feb 2017 Last revised: 7 Apr 2019

See all articles by Carsten Koenig

Carsten Koenig

University of Cologne - Faculty of Law; Harvard University - Harvard Law School

Date Written: September 2018

Abstract

Whereas the European Commission is not empowered to impose penalties on individuals according to Regulation 1/2003, many EU Member States allow their national competition authorities or criminal law enforcers to do so. However, because the Commission typically invokes its competence where markets in more than three Member States are affected, the divergence of sanctioning powers leads to the paradoxical situation that individuals may go unpunished in some of Europe’s most severe antitrust cases. Thus, the question arises whether national competition authorities and other competent bodies on the national level can complement prior decisions by the European Commission with additional sanctions exclusively available under national law. I argue, in this article, that neither Regulation 1/2003, nor the principle of ne bis in idem preclude national competition authorities and criminal law enforcers from imposing such “follow-on penalties” on managers and employees, where this is necessary, to ensure effective enforcement and their national law allows them to do so.

Keywords: EU competition law, Regulation 1/2003, individual liability, criminal law, enforcement, damages, fines, ne bis in idem, competition authorities

JEL Classification: K13, K14, K20, K21, K22, K42, L40

Suggested Citation

Koenig, Carsten, The Imposition of 'Follow-On Penalties' on Managers and Employees (September 2018). 13(2) Competition Law Review (2018) 139-161, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2922143

Carsten Koenig (Contact Author)

University of Cologne - Faculty of Law ( email )

Albertus-Magnus-Platz
Cologne, 50931
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://koerber.jura.uni-koeln.de/pd-koenig

Harvard University - Harvard Law School ( email )

1563 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

HOME PAGE: http://pcg.law.harvard.edu/carsten-koenig/

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
145
Abstract Views
774
Rank
361,118
PlumX Metrics