Making Contribution Work: The Liability of Immunity Recipients under the EU Antitrust Damages Directive

14(1) European Competition Journal 110-128 (2018)

Posted: 24 Feb 2017 Last revised: 20 May 2018

See all articles by Carsten Koenig

Carsten Koenig

University of Cologne - Faculty of Law; Harvard University - Harvard Law School

Date Written: January 1, 2017

Abstract

The EU Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions holds multiple injurers jointly and severally liable for the harm they cause through jointly infringing the competition laws. If an injurer pays to a victim more than the injurer’s fair share, the latter is entitled to obtain a contribution from any other infringer based on the injurers’ relative responsibility for the harm caused by the infringement. While these rules are relatively clear at first view, their practical application can be complex. This is particularly true for cases involving immunity recipients, small or medium-sized enterprises or parties to a settlement because such injurers’ liability can be restricted due to one of several privileges awarded by the Directive. Against this background, this paper illustrates on the basis of numerical examples how joint and several liabilities and especially contribution work under the framework established by the Directive. It also describes and comments on additional rules that may be employed by national legislators and courts to close the remaining gaps and achieve fair and efficient results.

Keywords: EU Competition Law, Joint and Several Liability, Multiple Injurers, Fines, Damages, Contribution, Antitrust Liability, Immunity, Leniency Rules, Regulation 1/2003

JEL Classification: K13, K20, K21, K22, L40

Suggested Citation

Koenig, Carsten, Making Contribution Work: The Liability of Immunity Recipients under the EU Antitrust Damages Directive (January 1, 2017). 14(1) European Competition Journal 110-128 (2018), Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2922144

Carsten Koenig (Contact Author)

University of Cologne - Faculty of Law ( email )

Albertus-Magnus-Platz
Cologne, 50931
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://koerber.jura.uni-koeln.de/pd-koenig

Harvard University - Harvard Law School ( email )

1563 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

HOME PAGE: http://pcg.law.harvard.edu/carsten-koenig/

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