Property Rights, Political Connections, and Corporate Investment

61 Pages Posted: 24 Feb 2017 Last revised: 29 Jul 2019

See all articles by Meng Miao

Meng Miao

Renmin University of China - Hanqing Institute

Dragon Yongjun Tang

The University of Hong Kong - Faculty of Business and Economics

Lixin Colin Xu

World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: July 21, 2019

Abstract

Despite the substantial literature on rural land property rights, studies on urban land property rights are rare. Here, we study the impact of an urban land titling program on firm investment. We find that this program leads to an increased investment rate for titling firms, but that this positive effect only holds for politically-connected firms. These effects are likely causal: they are more pronounced for those firms more likely to benefit from property rights strengthening; connected titling firms experienced fewer disputes than non-connected titling firms after the program; and the results remain robust when using instrumental variable estimation.

Keywords: Institution, Property Rights, Political Connection, Investment

JEL Classification: G32, G38, H13, O43

Suggested Citation

Miao, Meng and Tang, Dragon Yongjun and Xu, Lixin Colin, Property Rights, Political Connections, and Corporate Investment (July 21, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2922459 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2922459

Meng Miao

Renmin University of China - Hanqing Institute ( email )

59 Zhongguancun Street
Beijing, 100872
China

Dragon Yongjun Tang (Contact Author)

The University of Hong Kong - Faculty of Business and Economics ( email )

KKL 1004
Pokfulam Road
Pokfulam
Hong Kong
(852)22194321 (Phone)

Lixin Colin Xu

World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG) ( email )

1818 H Street, N.W.
MC 3-427
Washington, DC 20433
United States
202-473-4664 (Phone)
202-522-1155 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://econ.worldbank.org/staff/cxu

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
52
Abstract Views
351
rank
322,250
PlumX Metrics