Margin Squeeze: Where Competition Law and Sector Regulation Compete

Jura Falconis 2016-2017, Vol. 53(1), 3-60

58 Pages Posted: 23 Feb 2017 Last revised: 8 Jan 2018

See all articles by Friso Bostoen

Friso Bostoen

KU Leuven - Institute for Consumer, Competition & Market

Date Written: January 1, 2017

Abstract

This paper discusses abusive pricing practices by dominant undertakings. It starts with an overview of the different ways an undertaking can abuse its dominant position through pricing (chapter 2). The focus of this work is on margin squeeze. We start by defining margin squeeze (chapter 3), and then look at how margin squeeze is assessed (chapter 4 and 5). It will be examined why some undertakings appear to be more susceptible to this abuse than others (chapter 6). The last part of this paper investigates the place of margin squeeze in the European legislative framework. It first considers which kind of competition law abuse margin squeeze could be and currently is (chapter 7), and then focuses on the interaction of this competition law approach with the regulatory approach (chapter 8).

Keywords: EU Competition Law, Competition Law, Antitrust Law, Sector regulation, Margin squeeze, Telecommunications, Telecom

Suggested Citation

Bostoen, Friso, Margin Squeeze: Where Competition Law and Sector Regulation Compete (January 1, 2017). Jura Falconis 2016-2017, Vol. 53(1), 3-60. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2922633

Friso Bostoen (Contact Author)

KU Leuven - Institute for Consumer, Competition & Market ( email )

Tiensestraat 41
Leuven, Vlaams-Brabant 3000
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.law.kuleuven.be/ccm

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