Bounded Rationality and the Choice of Jury Selection Procedures

36 Pages Posted: 26 Feb 2017 Last revised: 13 Apr 2017

See all articles by Martin Van der Linden

Martin Van der Linden

Utah State University - Department of Economics and Finance

Date Written: April 12, 2017

Abstract

A peremptory challenge procedure allows the parties to a jury trial to dismiss some prospective jurors without justification. Complex challenge procedures offer an unfair advantage to parties who are better able to strategize. I introduce a new measure of strategic complexity based on “level-k” thinking and use this measure to compare challenge procedures often used in practice. In applying this measure, I overturn some commonly held beliefs about which jury selection procedures are “strategically simple.”

Suggested Citation

Van der Linden, Martin, Bounded Rationality and the Choice of Jury Selection Procedures (April 12, 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2922790 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2922790

Martin Van der Linden (Contact Author)

Utah State University - Department of Economics and Finance ( email )

Logan, UT 84322-1400
United States

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