Analyst Forecast Bundling

Forthcoming, Management Science

61 Pages Posted: 1 Mar 2017 Last revised: 4 Mar 2019

See all articles by Michael S. Drake

Michael S. Drake

Brigham Young University - Marriott School

Peter R. Joos


Joseph Pacelli

Harvard Business School

Brady J. Twedt

University of Oregon - Lundquist College of Business

Date Written: March 1, 2019


Changing economic conditions over the past two decades have created incentives for sell-side analysts to both provide their institutional clients tiered services and to streamline their written research process. One manifestation of these changes is an increased likelihood of analysts’ issuing earnings forecasts for multiple firms on the same day. We identify this bundling property and show that bundling has increased steadily over time. We provide field evidence that the practice is a cost-saving measure, a natural byproduct of analysts focusing on thematic research, and a reflection of forecast updating that occurs in advance of important events. Our empirical analyses show that bundled forecasts are less accurate, less bold, and less informative to investors than non-bundled forecasts. We also find that analysts who produce bundled forecasts provide valuable specialized services to their institutional clients. Our findings ultimately demonstrate that forecast bundling has important implications for the properties of analysts’ forecasts.

Keywords: Financial Analysts, Earnings Forecasts, Forecast Bundling

JEL Classification: G14, G24

Suggested Citation

Drake, Michael S. and Joos, Peter R. and Pacelli, Joseph and Twedt, Brady J., Analyst Forecast Bundling (March 1, 2019). Forthcoming, Management Science, Available at SSRN: or

Michael S. Drake (Contact Author)

Brigham Young University - Marriott School ( email )

United States

Peter R. Joos

INSEAD ( email )

1 Ayer Rajah Avenue
Singapore, 138676

Joseph Pacelli

Harvard Business School ( email )

Boston, MA 02163
United States

Brady J. Twedt

University of Oregon - Lundquist College of Business ( email )

Lundquist College of Business
1208 University of Oregon
Eugene, OR 97403
United States

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