Theorizing Regulatory Intermediaries: The RIT Model

Abstract

Regulation is typically conceived as a two-party relationship between a rule-maker or regulator (R) and a rule-taker or target (T). We set out an agenda for the study of regulation (and rules more broadly) as a three- (or more) party relationship – with intermediaries (I) at the center of the analysis. Intermediaries play major and varied roles in regulation, from providing expertise and feedback to facilitating implementation, monitoring the behavior of regulatory targets and building communities of assurance and trust. After developing the basic RIT model, we discuss important extensions and variations. We then discuss the varieties of regulatory capture that appear where intermediaries are involved. Empirical chapters in the volume apply the RIT framework and suggest extensions and modifications.

Keywords: intermediaries, rule-takers, rule-makers, regulation, regulatory governance, orchestration, capture

JEL Classification: L50