Theorizing Regulatory Intermediaries: The RIT Model

The Annals, American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 670, 2017, Forthcoming

39 Pages Posted: 5 Mar 2017

See all articles by Kenneth W. Abbott

Kenneth W. Abbott

Arizona State University

David Levi‐Faur

Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Political Science Department and The Federmann School of Public Policy and Government & School of Public Policy

Duncan Snidal

Nuffield College, University of Oxford

Date Written: February 28, 2017

Abstract

Regulation is typically conceived as a two-party relationship between a rule-maker or regulator (R) and a rule-taker or target (T). We set out an agenda for the study of regulation (and rules more broadly) as a three- (or more) party relationship – with intermediaries (I) at the center of the analysis. Intermediaries play major and varied roles in regulation, from providing expertise and feedback to facilitating implementation, monitoring the behavior of regulatory targets and building communities of assurance and trust. After developing the basic RIT model, we discuss important extensions and variations. We then discuss the varieties of regulatory capture that appear where intermediaries are involved. Empirical chapters in the volume apply the RIT framework and suggest extensions and modifications.

Keywords: intermediaries, rule-takers, rule-makers, regulation, regulatory governance, orchestration, capture

JEL Classification: L50

Suggested Citation

Abbott, Kenneth Wayne and Levi-Faur, David and Snidal, Duncan, Theorizing Regulatory Intermediaries: The RIT Model (February 28, 2017). The Annals, American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 670, 2017, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2925411 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2925411

Kenneth Wayne Abbott (Contact Author)

Arizona State University ( email )

Box 877906
Tempe, AZ 85287-7906
United States
480-965-5917 (Phone)

David Levi-Faur

Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Political Science Department and The Federmann School of Public Policy and Government & School of Public Policy ( email )

Mount Scopus
Jerusalem
Israel

Duncan Snidal

Nuffield College, University of Oxford ( email )

New Road
Oxford, Oxfordshire OX1 1NF
United Kingdom

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